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The Meeting of Revolutionary Roads:
Chilean-Cuban Interactions, 1959–1970
Rafael Pedemonte
Abstract Fidel Castro’s endorsement of Salvador Allende’s revolutionary program in August 1970 was
determined by global transformations and changing priorities within both Chile and Cuba. Since 1968,
favorable prospects for the Left encouraged Havana to abandon its radicalism premised on the inevitability of
armed struggle. Prior to 1970 Chile gradually promoted rapprochement with the socialist world and lessened
Cuba’s hemispheric isolation, imposed by the Organization of American States. It is within this framework
that the meeting between Cuba’s and Chile’s revolutions has to be understood. Allende, knowing that
Castro’s support would push the radical Left to side with Popular Unity in the 1970 elections, sent a
delegation to convince the Cubans that socialism could be achieved by peaceful means. These events and
strategic discussions within Chile and Cuba reveal how the history of the Left needs to be placed in a broad
context defined by the complex unfolding of domestic, hemispheric, and international transformations
shaping Latin America in the 1960s.
“Yes, categorically, in this specific moment, in Chile, I believe it is possible toreach socialism through . . . an electoral victory. . . . The battle is carried
out within an institutional framework, and that is why, I repeat: in this specific
case, in 1970 Chile, socialism can be reached by an electoral victory.”1
This statement—pronounced by Fidel Castro on August 1, 1970, nearly a
month before the Chilean presidential election that Salvador Allende would
win—constituted a milestone in Cuban foreign policy regarding Latin Amer-
ica. This declaration had a considerable impact in Chile. It could be seen as
illustrative of Havana’s new international flexibility. Given his previous radi-
calism, Castro’s optimism regarding Allende’s path to socialism was stunning.
Ever since the early 1960s, when Ernesto “Che” Guevara elaborated inGuerrilla
Warfare a theory that deemed violent upheaval necessary for an effective rev-
olution, the Cuban leaders had insisted on armed struggle as fundamental for
social transformation. During most of the 1960s, while the Communist parties
faithful to Moscow advocated for gradualism and alliances with a broader range
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1. El Siglo (Santiago), 5 Aug. 1970, p. 5.
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ofpolitical actors, Havana’s confidence in a democratic road to socialism tended
to wane. In view of this, Cuba’s decision to endorse the institutional project of
Popular Unity (UP) announced a major reassessment of Havana’s position in
world politics.2 Castro’s intervention in the midst of the presidential campaign
profoundly affected public opinion, particularly among a significant sector of
the Chilean Left. Cuba’s public validation of a socialist project carried out
by democratic means initiated an unexpected encounter between two revolu-
tionary roads, dramatically interrupted by Augusto Pinochet’s coup d’e´tat in
1973. It heralded the beginning of a collaboration between Chile and Cuba,
dramatically interrupted by Augusto Pinochet’s coup d’e´tat in 1973.
This partial and somewhat controversial ideological convergence has to be
understood as a result of wider hemispheric transformations within the inter-
American system, the progression of the Cold War, and specific develop-
ments in Chile and Cuba. As I will demonstrate, both Latin American countries
forged international policy within a complex frame determined by multilateral
dynamics experienced on a local and global scale. Domestic evolutions and
international constraints fused in a way that cannot be grasped as solely the
result of US-USSR tensions and international strategies. This article aims to
provide a decentered vision of the Cold War, using Cuba and Chile to show
that, beyond the clash of superpowers, the twentieth century was also power-
fully shaped by South-South crossings and connections.
A long-term perspective that highlights the earlier history informing
each country’s approach to the hemispheric system can offer a clearer view of
the Chilean-Cuban relationships that eventually led to the reestablishment of
diplomatic ties under Allende. I argue that it is essential to identify changes that
took place during the 1960s to fully understand the nature of Cuba’s com-
mitment to the UP as well as the manifold factors that set the tone for the
convergence of these two revolutionary roads. We will see that Castroite
ideology has been rather unstable, evolving along with hemispheric and global
conditions. Cuba’s connections with Chile until 1973 exemplify how national
political systems can be transformed as a result of international interactions.
Following this logic, this article presents Castro’s changed attitude toward the
electoral revolutionary path, embodied by Allende, in a wider context. The
tempering of Cuba’s radical international position, epitomized by Castro’s
backing of the UP, is difficult to understand without considering various Latin
American and global transformations that occurred throughout the 1960s.
2. The coalition headed by Salvador Allende was made up of left-wing
organizations—the Chilean Socialist Party (PSCh), the Chilean Communist Party
(PCCh), the Popular Unitary Action Movement (MAPU), the Independent Popular
Action (API), and the more moderate Radical Party (PR).
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Allende’s immediate decision upon assuming office to restore diplomatic
links with Cuba, making Chile the first South American country to do so, would
have been much more controversial without the earlier initiatives carried out by
the Christian Democratic administration headed by Eduardo Frei (1964–70).
The three-year honeymoon in Cuban-Chilean relations should also be seen as
a predictable outcome of a larger transformation. As the first part of this arti-
cle shows, the 1959 Cuban Revolution was not immediately condemned by
Chilean authorities. Committed to the principle of respecting other countries’
sovereignty, the conservative president Jorge Alessandri (1958–64) only reluc-
tantly agreed to call back the Chilean ambassador in Havana, under pressure
from a hostile inter-American system. Following the 1964 presidential election,
the Christian Democratic government was willing to contemplate reconcilia-
tion with the island, which would contribute to breaking Cuba’s hemispheric
isolation. It is within this frame of gradual rapprochement that Allende, after
receiving the Cubans’ endorsement of his presidential campaign, definitively
ended Havana’s seclusion within the inter-American system.
Elements linked to both the revolutionary prospects in Latin America and
the nature of the Cuban-Soviet alliance contributed to lessening Cuba’s com-
mitment to armed struggle and to shaping Havana’s new international stance.
I will show this by assessing the extent to which Castro’s acceptance of the
Chilean road to socialism contrasted with his earlier determination to export
revolution through violence. The last part of this article emphasizes the dis-
cussions leading to Cuba’s acknowledgment that, in Chile, revolution could be
achieved without a bloody fight. Castro’s 1970 statement on the matter, with
which I opened this article, was preceded by discussions with a UP delegation,
sent by Allende himself, that tried to persuade Castro and his advisers that
the soon-to-be Chilean president had a real chance to erect a socialist society
through electoral means. Allende and Castro were perfectly aware of the gap
separating each other’s revolutionary strategy, but they both proved willing to
forge an entente for the sake of Latin American revolution.
This analysis is possible thanks to access to new sources such as the reports
housed in the archives of both the Chilean and the Cuban Ministry of Foreign
Relations, based in Santiago and Havana, respectively. These new sources sup-
plement contemporary newspaper and magazine coverage, along with valuable
oral testimonies. Many of the personalities who played a key role in strength-
ening relations between Chile and Cuba were still alive when I wrote this article
and were eager to share their memories. This new array of sources allows for a
long-term perspective on what made possible an embrace between Allende’s
project and the Cuban approach to revolution at the dawn of the 1970s, when a
new revolutionary government came to power in Chile.
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The “Cuban Question” in Chilean Foreign Policy before 1970
In January 1959, when Castro’s revolutionaries entered Havana, Fulgencio
Batista’s fall was broadly received in Chile as positive. To most observers, the
Cuban Revolution’s success seemed a necessary transformation that would
increase social justice and democracy. At that time Castro had not used the
word Communism, and there were few portents of the future alliance with the
Soviet Union. Manuel Urrutia, a lawyer committed to the Western sphere, was
appointed president after Batista’s departure.3 Castro traveled to the United
States in April 1959 and advocated for closer commercial relations. The pro-
Moscow Popular Socialist Party was not represented in the new administration,
and most revolutionaries, including Castro, repeatedly denied any sympathy for
the Eastern world.4
In this confused context, it should not be surprising that even some con-
servative newspapers in Chile, including El Mercurio and El Diario Ilustrado,
regarded the events as a justifiable reaction against “tyranny.”5 The Christian
Democratic Party (PDC) went further by welcoming the Cuban Revolution.
An early letter signed by Patricio Aylwin, president of the PDC, stated that
the members of his party had “followed with great interest and admiration
the courageous fight that [Castro] headed for the Cubans’ liberation.” Aylwin
placed the revolutionary triumph amid wider developments aimed at “liberat-
ing all the people of America” and concluded with an invitation to Castro to
visit Chile.6 The comandante was not able to leave the country, but he sent his
3. According to President Urrutia, “certainly, the United States and Cuba respond to
the same democratic, republican, and liberal ideology. . . . On the one hand, our Western
culture . . . on the other hand, the one [the Soviet Union’s] that kidnaps the sovereignty
and the individual consciousness of people through persecution and death.” “Discurso del
ciudadano presidente doctor Manuel Urrutia,” 3 Mar. 1959, Archivo Nacional de la
Repu´blica de Cuba, Havana, fondo Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores, leg. 9, p. 159.
4. As Castro complained in May 1959, “some people slander us by saying that the
government is infiltrated by communists.” “Extractos del discurso pronunciado por el
Primer Ministro de Cuba,” Dec. 1961, Archivo Histo´rico del Ministerio de Asuntos
Exteriores de Chile, Santiago (hereafter cited as AHMAEC), fondo Paı´ses, carpeta Cuba 1
(1961).
5. Fermandois Huerta, “Chile,” 124. This 1982 article raised the “cuestion cubana”
that I refer to in this section’s title. While this piece is remarkable, especially given the
limited access to sources and ideological biases at the time, I aim to update Fermandois
Huerta’s earlier approach through a new set of testimonies and archival materials.
6. Patricio Aylwin and Alberto Jerez to Fidel Castro, Santiago, Jan. 1959, Repositorio
Digital Archivo Patricio Aylwin Azo´car, accessed 22 Feb. 2018, http://www
.archivopatricioaylwin.cl/handle/123456789/3896.
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brother Rau´l to Santiago, where Jose´ Musalem, a Christian Democrat who had
recently stayed in Havana, hosted the Cuban delegation in August 1959.7 It is
interesting to note that for a committed revolutionary such as Carlos Lechuga,
the new Cuban government’s first ambassador to Santiago, the PDC was,
among Chilean political parties, “the closest to the Cuban Revolution from an
ideological point of view.”8
In these early years of the revolution, political parties played a major role in
bolstering Cuba-Chile relations. In the absence of an official commitment to
expanding relations with a revolutionary government that was increasingly
adopting a leftist turn, Chilean nonstate actors stepped into the breach. Both
the PSCh and PCCh hailed Castro’s anti-imperialist stance and rapidly became
key mediators between Chile and the island. Salvador Allende was among the
first foreign activists to visit Cuba after Batista’s fall, meeting Guevara and
Castro, the latter with whom he cultivated a long-standing friendship. Allende
visited Havana almost annually until his death in 1973.9 Many Socialists, such
as Joel Marambio and Ricardo Nu´n˜ez, became strong advocates of the Cuban
Revolution. During the second half of the 1960s, when the PSCh tended to
radicalize its revolutionary discourse, some party members even received secret
military training on the island.10
Encouraged by Castro’s determination to build an alliance with the Soviet
Union, some Chilean Communists settled in Cuba to work in public insti-
tutions such as the National Institute for Agrarian Reform, the University of
Santiago de Cuba, and the Ministry of Economics.11 Other nongovernmen-
tal organizations emerged to offset the lack of regular connections between
the two states. Headed by the writer Matilde Ladro´n de Guevara, the Chilean-
Cuban Cultural Institute (ICCC) was established in Santiago to “promote
7. Musalem,Mi vida entre lı´neas, 93–94; Jose´ Musalem and Clemencia Sarquis, interview
by author, Santiago, 16 Oct. 2017. The Belgian politician Raymond Scheyven noted during
a trip to Chile that, after the revolutionary triumph in Cuba, the PDC adopted a more
leftist discourse. The visitor was impressed by the Christian Democrats’ passionate speech
and particularly by their constant attacks against “imperialism.” Scheyven, De Punta del
Este, 11–13.
8. Jefe de la Seccio´n C to jefe del departamento, Havana, 11 Nov. 1959, Archivo
Central del Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores de Cuba, Havana (hereafter cited as
AMINREX), fondo Chile, cajuela 1959.
9. Over the revolution’s first three years, Allende visited Havana on five occasions.
Amoro´s, Allende, 176, 443.
10. Ferna´ndez Abara, Go´ngora Escobedo, and Arancibia Clavel, Ricardo Nu´n˜ez, 86.
11. Emilio Edwards Bello to Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores de Chile, Havana,
17 Dec. 1959, AHMAEC, fondo Histo´rico, carpeta Cuba 1959, no. 5292A.
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cultural propaganda.”12 Reflecting the initially widespread acceptance of the
revolution, the institute’s members were not all left-inclined propagandists: Ana
Eugenia Ugalde and Rudecindo Ortega, for instance, were both members ofthe
centrist PR.13
But this consensus would not last forever. Facing American hostility,
Cuban authorities shifted policy and embarked on a more radical path. As
Cuba’s first contacts with Moscow were established, the US administration
imposed strict trade restrictions and, in 1960, refused to process Soviet oil at
US-owned refineries on the island. The Cuba–United States rupture was soon
followed by a hemispheric reassessment of inter-American relations. A number
of Latin American countries in the Organization of American States (OAS)
paved the way for Cuba’s diplomatic isolation. In 1962 the OAS decided to
exclude Cuba from its regular meetings. Two years later, during the OAS’s Ninth
Conference of Foreign Ministers of the Americas, assembled in Washington,
DC, a resolution was approved to break official and commercial relations with
Havana, despite opposition from Chile, Mexico, Bolivia, and Uruguay.14
In Chile, President Alessandri reluctantly followed the resolution. But
Santiago did not hide its uneasiness. As the minister of foreign affairs, Julio
Philippi, pointed out in August 1964, the OAS resolution was “compulsory
for my government according to Article 20” of the Inter-American Treaty of
Reciprocal Assistance, despite Chile having voted against the resolution.15
Alessandri was obviously dissatisfied with the direction of the Cuban Revolu-
tion, but he publicly protested inflicting such a harsh blow to Havana, noting
how the Chilean government had opposed “with a large supply of arguments”
the cutting of relations with Cuba, which Santiago considered “inconvenient
and wrong.” However, he lamented, “we were defeated,” and “the strict obser-
vance of treaties and the respect of the agreements democratically adopted by
the required majority have always been vital principles of Chile’s international
policy.”16
In this context, leftist political parties and pro-Cuban nonstate institu-
tions in Chile stepped up their efforts to disseminate a positive view of the
12. The ICCC already had four regional sections by 1961, in Temuco, Arica,
Concepcio´n, and Valparaı´so. “Memoria anual del Instituto Chileno Cubano de Cultura,
1961,” Santiago, n.d., AMINREX, fondo Chile, cajuela 1961.
13. Ladro´n de Guevara, Adio´s al can˜averal, 13, 180.
14. This regular conference was established in 1947 by the Inter-American Treaty of
Reciprocal Assistance, also known as the Rio Treaty.
15. Julio Philippi to Chilean embassy in Havana, Santiago, 11 Aug. 1964,
AHMAEC, fondo Paı´ses, carpeta Cuba 10 (1964).
16. Jorge Alessandri, quoted in Fermandois Huerta, “Chile,” 190–91.
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Cuban revolutionary model. Due to “selfishness” and “virtually nonexistent
activity,” the ICCC underwent a shakeup, with Ladro´n de Guevara expelled
and replaced by the poet A´ngel Cruchaga Santa Marı´a, who restructured the
organization around notorious leftists such as Allende, Pablo Neruda, and
Clodomiro Almeyda.17 Meanwhile, the Cuban Revolution provided a powerful
imaginary for Chilean leftists, many of whom started to perceive the island as
the political horizon that real revolutionaries should strive for. This held for
left-wing Christian Democrats, Communists, and Socialists, the last of whom
often resorted to increasingly aggressive rhetoric that echoed Castro’s insur-
rectionary strategy for revolution. Dropping his previous commitment to
electoral tactics, the Socialist senator Alejandro Chele´n denounced in 1960 “the
opium of a nonexistent civic superiority” and asserted that the people “are tired
of elections that only add oxygen to a parasitic democracy.” Chele´n concluded
that only by embracing Castro’s model of “revolutionary action” would Chilean
revolutionaries “find the route heading toward a definitive liberation” and the
“total transformation of the system that subjugates us.”18 For some Socialists,
their fellow party member Allende no longer seemed an adequate presidential
candidate. According to Alejandro Philippi, who traveled to Cuba shortly after
Allende’s defeat in the 1964 presidential election, the latter had “fulfilled his
role in history” and was losing his “political punch,” “no longer cut out for
leading and guiding the masses in the armed struggle.”19
The dissemination of a heroic, legendary depiction of recent Cuban events
was reinforced by effective tourist diplomacy. A Santiago-based Cuban diplo-
mat suggested this in order to “persuade” people belonging to “other circles”
besides “Socialists and Communists that the Cuban Revolution is positive.”20
As a result, Havana spent considerable resources to host and convert potential
fellow travelers. One of them was the Christian Democrat Patricio Hurtado,
who visited Cuba in 1962 despite his initial criticism; he returned to Chile with a
laudatory impression. Hurtado not only uncritically reproduced the mythol-
ogies of the Cuban saga (such as the myth of the twelve survivors after the
Granma landing) but also publicly praised the endeavors to build a “New Man”
17. Instituto Chileno-Cubano de Cultura to La´zaro Vigoa, Santiago, 2 Feb. 1961,
AMINREX, fondo Chile, cajuela 1961.
18. Chele´n, La Revolucio´n Cubana, 30–38.
19. Alberto Velasco and Manuel Sa´nchez, Polı´tica Regional 1–Ame´rica, Havana, 23
Nov. 1964, AMINREX, fondo Chile, cajuela 1964. Philippi is presented in this document
as Allende’s personal secretary.
20. Edgardo Arnal to Miguel A´ngel Duque Estrada, Santiago, 10 Apr. 1960,
AMINREX, fondo Chile, cajuela 1960.
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and provided a Christian vindication for Castro’s radical measures.21 Hurtado’s
pilgrimages to Havana did not stop, and he displayed an increasingly enthusi-
astic stance toward the Cuban model. After a controversy between Frei and
Castro that was triggered during his 1966 trip to Havana, Hurtado sided with
Castro and left the PDC to campaign for a “broad revolutionary front” that
would eventually lead to the “people’s seizure of power,” which “would surely
not occur by peaceful means.”22
Among the factors favoring the dissemination of idealized references to the
Cuban Revolution, the proliferation of bilateral friendship societies such as the
ICCC was significant, as they entered into the popular imaginary and con-
tributed to Chileans assimilating the revolutionary narrative propagated by
Cuban authorities. One such organization, the Movement of Solidarity and
Defense of the Cuban Revolution, sent in 1964 a petition to the newly elected
president Frei reminding him ofthe Christian Democrats’ favorable inclination
toward Cuba in the past and claiming that American “aggression” had insti-
gated Alessandri to break relations with Cuba.23 Indeed, by doing so Alessandri
imposed a heavy burden on Frei’s government. Elected on a reformist agenda,
the so-called “revolution in liberty,” Frei, along with his minister of foreign
affairs, Gabriel Valde´s, sought to lead his country in an international opening.
Along with a reformist social and economic policy—including an agrarian
reform, the partial nationalization of the copper industry, and an innovative
project called Promocio´n Popular—Frei immediately established diplomatic
relations with the Soviet Union and five other socialist countries.
The need to maintain the country’s traditionally close relationship with the
White House ultimately deterred Chilean authorities from taking any step that
21. “Conferencia del diputado Demo´crata Cristiano Sr. Patricio Hurtado,” Santiago,
25 July 1962, AMINREX, fondo Chile, cajuela 1962. The revolutionary narrative has
always preferred to retain the number of 12 survivors, which is inaccurate but echoes the
Christian tradition, still very strongly engraved in people’s identities during the revolution’s
first years.
22. “Patricio Hurtado. Chile,” Havana, 3 Feb. 1968, AMINREX, fondo Chile,
cajuela 1968.
23. Movimiento de Solidaridad y Defensa de la Revolucio´n Cubana to Eduardo
Frei, Santiago, 9 Nov. 1964, AHMAEC, fondo Paı´ses, carpeta Cuba 10 (1964). The
Movement of Solidarity and Defense of the Cuban Revolution was established in mid-
1960. Headed by the union leader Clotario Blest, it aimed at disseminating the “conquests of
the revolution.” Clotario Blest and Ernesto Miranda to Juan Jose´ Dı´az del Real, Santiago, 4
Oct. 1960, AMINREX, fondo Chile, cajuela 1960. This initiative was soon reinforced by
regional efforts, such as the constitution in Temuco of the Solidarity Commando with
the Cuban Republic. Jorge Flores and Vicente Aguayo to Juan Jose´ Dı´az del Real, Temuco, 23
July 1960, AMINREX, fondo Chile, cajuela 1960.
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would allow for Cuba’s regional reintegration. However, as Valde´s acknowl-
edged in 1965, Cuba was also on the government’s agenda. He hinted at the
possibility of “cooperating actively for the reintegration of this state in the
American family . . . whatever the socioeconomic regime prevailing there.”
Furthermore, Valde´s announced that “Chile’s government w[ould] not be absent
from the negotiations meant to reestablish American unity”; addressing US
hostility, he asserted that “we are highly concerned by the fact that a country
belonging culturally and geographically to the Latin community of our hemi-
sphere has been marginalized from the normal life of interstate relations.”24
The Cubans saw this as a potentially favorable omen. Inquiring into the
Christian Democratic administration, the Cuban Ministry of Foreign Affairs
found it “conspicuously different from the majority of the other governments in
the continent that are repeating the well-known American imperialist slogans.”
Somewhat unique to the region, the Chilean government was the “creator of
social measures aimed at benefiting popular sectors.” Because of their openly
critical stance toward the OAS and their recognition of Cuba “as a socialist
country,” the Chilean authorities offered a hopeful prospect for Havana’s
hemispheric integration. The ministry report concluded that Cuban leaders
should adopt a “cautious” and “wait-and-see” attitude, as the “content of Chile’s
pronouncements constitutes objective confirmation of the rightness of Cuba’s
position regarding Latin America.”25
The atmosphere in the mid-1960s was, nonetheless, unlikely to favor such
hopes. The Tricontinental Conference held in Havana in January 1966—
attended by leftist delegates from Asia, Africa, and Latin America—and espe-
cially the First Conference of the Latin American Organization of Solidarity
(in 1967), the high point of Castro’s radical views on Latin American revo-
lution, reinforced the gap between the OAS’s position and Cuba’s efforts to
export revolution across the continent. Moreover, the Soviets’ willingness to
forge links with other Latin American countries created strains with the
Cubans, who were horrified by Moscow’s efforts to gain recognition from these
bourgeois states.26 The period from 1966 to 1968 saw increasing divergence
between Havana and Moscow. Additionally, two main factors contributed to
an almost irreconcilable rift within the Latin American Left: strategic differ-
ences regarding the right formula to prompt a real revolution (armed struggle
24. Gabriel Valde´s, “La polı´tica internacional chilena,” Polı´tica y Espı´ritu (Santiago),
Jan.–Feb. 1965, pp. 28–29.
25. Polı´tica Regional 1—Ame´rica, “Chile: Manifestacio´n sobre Cuba de la
Democracia Cristiana,” Havana, 11 Jan. 1965, AMINREX, fondo Chile, cajuela 1965.
26. Gleijeses, Conflicting Missions, 217–20.
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in the countryside, mass mobilization, electoral participation, or enlarged
political alliances), and the Soviet Union’s sympathetic approach to Frei and
other administrations in the region.27 Castro increasingly perceived the revo-
lution in liberty as a threat to the popularity of his own radical revolution-
ary path. The comandante violently attacked Frei in 1966 as a “coward who
abuses power,” a “liar,” and a “vulgar politician,” in a message directed to both
Chilean and Soviet authorities.28 Tensions intensified when Moscow signed
three commercial agreements with Santiago in 1967. Under these circum-
stances, Valde´s’s hope to develop further ties with Cuba seemed, for the
moment, unrealistic. Rather, from 1966 to 1968, as Cuba insisted with renewed
zeal on the need to overthrow the established regimes in Latin America, the
regional governments’ united front against Havana tended to strengthen.
But this apparent unanimity suffered a major blow in February 1970, when
Chile’s Christian Democratic administration publicly announced the reestab-
lishment of commercial exchanges with Cuba. This move was made possible
by a new international framework. Having witnessed a series of disheartening
setbacks for insurgent guerrilla movements across Latin America, the Cubans
were forced to consider different methods for advancing social justice (a point
that I will discuss further). Cuba’s new flexibility encouraged the Christian
Democrats to consider a gradual opening up to the island. Seeking to diver-
sify partners in order to benefit from new potential international markets and
thereby reduce Chile’s dependence on American assistance, Valde´s sent in 1968
Belisario Velasco, operations manager ofthe Empresa de Comercio Agrı´cola, as
Chile’s first official delegate to China and, immediately thereafter, Havana, with
the mission of discussing commercial exchange with both of these socialist
states.
Velasco managed to arrange an ambitious deal with the Chinese, who
agreed to sell 1,000 tons of tea to Santiago. Velasco’s stay in Havana also proved
27. One of the strongest defenders of a peaceful road to socialism within the Latin
American Left was the PCCh, which led to overt controversy with the Cubans. Communist
poet Pablo Neruda’s trip to the United States in 1966 provided a good pretext for Cuba to
respond to the PCCh’s electoral strategy while highlighting Havana’s insurrectionist views. A
group of Cuban intellectuals published an “open letter” denouncing Neruda’s conciliatory
attitude toward American “imperialism.” The letter also laid out a deeper concern
regarding the PCCh’s general political line: “For us . . . the road to a real liberation from
wars (cold or hot) must come through national liberation struggles, through guerrillas, and
not through an impossible conciliation.” “Una carta a Neruda,” Punto Final (Santiago),
second half of Aug. 1966, p. 20. The letter was written at the request of President
Osvaldo Dortico´s, who personally contacted the Cuban artists. See Otero, Llover sobre
mojado, 199; Anto´n Arrufat, interview by author, Havana, 26 Feb. 2018.
28. Fidel Castro, “Frei y la ma´scara del reformismo,”Cuba (Havana), Apr. 1966, p. 16.
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fruitful. After spending almost ten days with Castro traveling throughout the
island, Velasco laid the foundation for an agricultural agreement that was
eventually signed in February 1970.29 The establishment ofeconomic ties with
Cuba, a risky decision likely to damage Chile’s historic alliance with the White
House, must be regarded as undeniable evidence of Frei’s diplomatic flexibility.
Additionally, the decision enshrined in the 1970 accord to send a consider-
able amount of agricultural products (garlic, beans, and onions) to Cuba repre-
sented the first step toward hemispheric normalization, prompting Havana’s
gradual reintegration into the inter-American scene. We cannot fully under-
stand Allende’s determination to reestablish diplomatic links with Havana
without considering these earlier efforts of the Christian Democrats. Despite
strong resistance within Chilean society and abroad, Frei’s administration
became the first Latin American government to offer the Cubans an entry point
back into the regional matrix.30 But this rapprochement could not have been
achieved without a clear transformation of Cuba’s hemispheric policy, notice-
able since the second half of 1968.
Cuba: From Armed Struggle to Multiple Paths toward Revolution
As a result of the guerrillas’ tragic failures all over Latin America, epitomized by
Che Guevara’s death in Bolivia in 1967, Cuban leaders realized that they needed
to shift their international policy, henceforth emphasizing state-to-state rela-
tionships instead of clandestine subversion.31 As the former advocate of the
violent road for Latin America’s revolutions, Re´gis Debray, pointed out in 1974,
“The physical disappearance of Che, brutal, precipitous, incredible, was like a
cold shower. . . . It is more than a symbol; his death represents a real shift in the
struggle. In 1967, the rural guerrilla’s curve turned downward, ineluctably.”32
Moreover, Guevara was one of the most obstinate critical voices within the
Cuban leadership against the Soviets’ international priorities. Therefore, the
29. Belisario Velasco, interview by author, Santiago, 20 Sept. 2016; Valde´s, Suen˜os y
memorias, 180–85.
30. The conservative newspaper El Mercurio accused La Moneda of fostering a
“reconciliation movement unilaterally generated, with which earlier affronts are forgiven.”
The Colombian minister of foreign affairs condemned Chile’s decision to deal with
Havana, while the US ambassador worriedly called President Frei to obtain further
explanations after his commercial agreement. El Mercurio (Santiago), 21 Feb. 1970, p. 3;
Valde´s, Suen˜os y memorias, 185.
31. Harmer, “Two, Three, Many Revolutions?,” 82–86.
32. Debray, La critique des armes, 245.
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end of his involvement in Bolivia—strongly objected to by the Kremlin—
contributed to improving Cuba–Soviet Union relations.33 For the Cubans, this
reassessment of strategies was also due to the guerrillas’ inability to master rural
warfare techniques. As Castro put it in a secret meeting in 1970, although
“concrete aid” was delivered to revolutionary movements, combatants “were
not capable of assimilating all the assistance that we could give.”34
Compounding the rural guerrillas’ disasters, Moscow’s patience regarding
Havana’s radicalism was about to run out. Alexei Kosygin traveled to the island
to deliver a “virtual ultimatum”: “cease and desist from trying to foment rev-
olution in Latin America or suffer the consequences.”35 Economic pressures
soon followed. A report from the Cuban Ministry of Foreign Affairs alarmingly
noted that the commercial deal offered by Moscow for 1968–69 involved a
“freezing” of Soviet oil delivery to the island; the ministry concluded that this
“unacceptable and impossible” plan “openly conspires against the economic
development of the country.”36 Threatened by the Soviets, the Cuban leader-
ship had no option but to abandon its previous defiance. A first step in that
direction was taken in August 1968, when Castro unexpectedly supported the
Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia. After this, the Soviets fully restored com-
mercial exchange with Havana, while Cuba’s administration embarked on an
internal transformation inspired by the Soviet model. The guerrillero ethos was
gradually replaced by a more institutionalized political structure based on the
prominent position of the Cuban Communist Party, created in 1965.
The recognition of the Soviet Union’s leading position within the Com-
munist movement pushed the Cubans to drop their belligerency and to present
noninsurrectional revolutionary methods in a better light, particularly in Latin
America, where significant changes had been apparent since 1968. As Castro
later asserted, through “different paths, methods, and strategies” the “Latin
American revolutionary movements” had made progress toward “the seizure
of power.”37
33. Brown, Cuba’s Revolutionary World, 99–101.
34. “Entrevista de nuestro Primer Ministro Comandante Fidel Castro con
representantes de la prensa y la televisio´n de Chile,” Havana, 1970, AMINREX, fondo
Chile, cajuela 1974.
35. Blight and Brenner, Sad and Luminous Days, 125.
36. “Memora´ndum de la delegacio´n gubernamental de la Repu´blica de Cuba para la
concertacio´n de un convenio comercial a mediano plazo con la URSS,” Havana, 25 Jan.
1968, AMINREX, fondo URSS, cajuela 1968–1969.
37. Juan Enrique Vega to Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores de Chile, Havana, 13
Aug. 1971, AHMAEC, fondo Paı´ses, carpeta Cuba 12 (1971).
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The first step toward a new position regarding revolutionary prospects
in Latin America came with Juan Velasco Alvarado’s seizure of power in Peru
in 1968. Although General Velasco Alvarado was by no means a Communist,
he was engaged in a general transformation of Peruvian domestic and foreign
policy, including nationalization and agrarian reform, and deployed a radical
anti-imperialist discourse. Long before the arrival of the first Cuban ambas-
sador to Lima, the Castro brothers eagerly observed the rapid radicalization of
the military government. In 1969, the lı´der ma´ximo openly declared that Velasco
Alvarado’s administration had a “revolutionary character.”38 Jorge Edwards—
appointed by Allende, after winning the presidency, as the charge´ d’affaires to
Havana and tasked with opening the Chilean embassy there—witnessed first-
hand Castro’s enthusiasm for Velasco Alvarado, a “man of the left, driven by
honorable and patriotic purposes.”39 To understand this acceptance, we should
not forget that the Cuban Revolution itself had not been carried out in the name
of a particular ideology before 1961. Referring to Peru in 1971, Castro stressed
that Velasco Alvarado’s lack of a firm ideological orientation might be explained
by the fact that “revolutionary processes are not born on the first day with an
absolute definition.”40 Moreover, as pointed out by a former Chilean diplomat
who had regular contacts with the Cubans, the strategy of Velasco Alvarado, a
strongman controlling the armed forces and thus less likely to be overthrown,
seemed to correspond to the Cubans’ idea of how the initial stage of revolu-
tionary transformation should proceed.41 After visiting Chile in 1971, Castro
stopped in Lima, where he stressed that “if I were a Peruvian revolutionary . . . I
would try to encourage this process.”42 In July 1972, the newly appointed
Peruvian ambassador in Havana, Joaquı´n Heredia, offered an unusually pas-
sionate message, calling Castro a “bright beacon illuminating, guiding, pro-
viding faith and hope to the oppressed people of the world.”43 Tellingly, the
Cuban ambassador appointed to Lima was a very prominent figure: Antonio
Nu´n˜ez Jime´nez, one of Castro’s closest collaborators at the beginning of the
38. Fidel Castro, “Discurso de Fidel en el C. Guiteras,” Polı´tica Internacional (Havana),
14 July 1969, pp. 250–52.
39. Jorge Edwards to Direccio´n de Relaciones Internacionales, Departamento
Ame´rica, Havana, 10 Dec. 1970, AHMAEC, fondo Paı´ses, carpeta Cuba 11 (1970).
40. Vega to Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores de Chile, Havana, 13 Aug. 1971,
AHMAEC, fondo Paı´ses, carpeta Cuba 12 (1971).
41. Francisco Ferna´ndez, interview by author, Santiago, 16 Nov. 2016.
42. Castro, Cuba-Chile, 543.
43. Juan Enrique Vega to Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores de Chile, Havana, 24
July 1972, AHMAEC, fondo Paı´ses, carpeta Cuba 16 (1972).
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revolutionary process. Another powerful signal came in December 1972, when
a Peruvian military delegation reached Havana in order to assess the quality of
arms and equipment imported from the Soviet Union.44
After having scorned any sort of alternative path to social justice during
most of the 1960s, Havana began to accept different revolutionary experiences,
rooted in each country’s own political evolution. Rau´l Roa, Cuban minister of
foreign affairs, acknowledged in 1972 that “three types of revolutionary pro-
cesses” were being successfully carried out at the time: the Cuban, Chilean,
and Peruvian paths.45 Cuba also regarded other Latin American progressive
leaders with enthusiasm. Bolivia’s General Alfredo Ovando embarked on a
reformist agenda that led to the nationalization of US-owned companies.
Ovando’s efforts were continued by another military leader, Juan Jose´ Torres,
whose overthrow in 1971 constituted a significant blow for the Cubans.46
Commenting on a speech in which Castro invoked “a wave of revolutionary
radicalization . . . shaking the continent,” the Cuban journalist Carlos Nu´n˜ez
observed how “we can see now in Bolivia a revolutionary, convulsed, and rad-
icalized people.” “Imperialists are worried,” Castro continued, and “we will not
do any favors to the imperialists.”47
The case of Omar Torrijos, the Panamanian military leader who took
power through a coup d’e´tat in 1968, is interesting. Like Velasco Alvarado,
Torrijos was a member of the armed forces who forcibly held on to power and
preached an intensely nationalistic discourse. His effort to take over the Panama
Canal, owned by the United States since the beginning ofthe twentieth century,
was seen as proof of his anti-imperialist leanings. Castro backed “the govern-
ment guided by General Torrijos” and deemed the Panamanian people “one of
the most rebellious in Latin America.”48
The Cubans were now also willing to support progressive politicians
who gained power by democratic means. The Ecuadorian leader Jose´ Marı´a
Velasco Ibarra, elected president in 1968 for the fifth time, followed a reformist
44. Gonzalo Rojas to Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores de Chile, Havana, 18 Dec.
1972, AHMAEC, fondo Paı´ses, carpeta Cuba 16 (1972). Peru eventually bought
sophisticated Soviet weapons, including tanks, becoming the only South American
country to import Soviet warfare mate´riel. Berrios and Blasier, “Peru and the Soviet Union.”
45. Juan Enrique Vega to Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores de Chile, Havana, 10
July 1972, AHMAEC, fondo Paı´ses, carpeta Cuba 16 (1972).
46. Harmer, “Two, Three, Many Revolutions?,” 75–77.
47. Carlos Nu´n˜ez, “Cuba: La lı´nea de siempre,” Cuba Internacional (Havana), July
1971, p. 6.
48. Juan Enrique Vega to Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores de Chile, Havana, 7
Jan. 1972, AHMAEC, fondo Paı´ses, carpeta Cuba 16 (1972).
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and rather authoritarian political line. Instead of being regarded as a tradi-
tional figure embodying the long-standing supremacy of a decadent oligarchy,
Velasco Ibarra was praised by the Cubans for his social and nationalistic con-
cerns. After his trip to Chile in 1971, Castro stopped in Guayaquil and met the
Ecuadorian leader. At a press conference, Castro celebrated Quito’s new inter-
national approach. He particularly appreciated the government’s vote in favor
of “the entry ofthe People’s Republic of China into the United Nations,” which
represented “one of the greatest defeats of imperialism in the diplomatic
field.”49
The Uruguayan presidential election, held in November 1971, had also
raised Cuban hopes. Aiming to replicate the UP’s success in Chile, the Broad
Front, a coalition of many different leftist parties, was well positioned to attain
power. The comandante observed with optimism this “electoral battle,” seeing
in the Broad Front “an emergent possibility” likely to confirm the appropri-
ateness of Allende’s democratic path.50
Before the UP’s arrival to power in Chile, Cuba’s openness resulted in
rapprochement with the Chilean Christian Democrats. Gabriel Valde´s’s inde-
pendent stance on foreign policy was judged a brave step that challenged US
hemispheric hegemony.51 As already noted, Frei’s readiness to reestablish com-
mercial ties with Havana helped to temper Cuban hostility. Castro acknowl-
edged that Frei’s Chile had to be distinguished from other reactionary coun-
tries. The Cubans recognized in mid-1970 that Santiago’s approval ofexporting
agrarian products to Havana represented “one of those concrete events con-
firming the existence of a new situation in Latin America.”52 Highlighting the
change in the international atmosphere from 1964 to the late 1960s, spurred by
the progressive awakening to Washington’s supremacy amid the Vietnam War,
Castro observed how “Chile is not the same as the dictatorships in Brazil,
Argentina, or Uruguay.”53 This somewhat prudent statement was accompanied
by a more discreet but revealing gesture in favor of the Christian Democrats.
49. Castro, Cuba-Chile, 559.
50. Castro, 273. Castro acknowledged this during a meeting in Concepcio´n, Chile,
in November 1971.
51. Valde´s was behind the so-called Vin˜a del Mar Consensus of 1969, a declaration
from representatives of 21 Latin American countries presented by Valde´s to Richard Nixon
and Henry Kissinger. Valde´s stressed the “excessive profits” obtained by the United
States in its commercial relationships with Latin America and accused Secretary of State
Kissinger of being an “imperialist.” Valde´s, Suen˜os y memorias, 196. See also Henrı´quez
and van Klaveren, “Chile empieza.”
52. Cuba Internacional (Havana), July 1970, p. 18.
53. El Siglo (Santiago), 5 Aug. 1970, p. 3.
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When Beatriz Allende, daughter of Salvador, came back from Havana a few
days after her father’s election, she brought a message from Castro suggesting
that Valde´s should remain in his position as minister of foreign affairs under
the new government.54 Previously, Castro had acknowledged that Valde´s
“has expressed several times—in the United Nations, in different international
organizations—a position that clearly differed from classic positions regarding
Cuba held by all other ministries of foreign affairs.”55
With Cuba seeing an opportunity to benefit by reemerging on the
hemispheric scene, Havana deliberately defined a more flexible approach. As
criticisms regarding Cuba’s explicit allegiance to the Soviet Union—a move
frowned on by several observers sympathetic to the Cuban experience but
reluctant to accept the Soviet model—intensified, Cuba started to present
itself as a potential partner to many Latin American governments. A num-
ber of Latin American leaders contributed to this turn from 1968 to 1973,
including former rivals to Castro such as Frei. Allende’s arrival to power, as
we will now see, opened the most promising path toward dismantling the
US-sponsored continental blockade of Cuba. But as I have attempted to
emphasize, Castro’s support for Allende’s revolution and the post-1970 Cuban-
Chilean political alliance has to be understood within this wider international
context.
Cuba’s Support of the Chilean Road to Socialism
The UP’s success in the September 4, 1970, elections was good news for Cuban
officials. It represented an opportunity to gain a stable position within the inter-
American scene, as Allende immediately decreed the exchange of ambassadors
with Cuba, in spite of Castro’s own warning about the consequences of such an
abrupt opening.56 Through Cuba’s embassy in Santiago—its first embassy in
South America since 1964—officials were able to establish secret contacts and
increase ties to neighboring countries. With tacit support from Argentina and
Peru, a number of Cuban delegates crossed the Andes to initiate negotiations
54. “Conversacio´n del embajador,” 413. This favorable opinion regarding Valde´s was
confirmed by two Chilean delegates who traveled to Havana and met Castro before the
presidential election of 1970. Camilo Salvo, interview by author, Santiago, 5 Sept. 2016;
Alfredo Jadresic and Patricia Samsing, interview by author, Santiago, 11 Oct. 2017.
55. “Entrevista de nuestro Primer Ministro Comandante Fidel Castro,” Havana,
1970, AMINREX, fondo Chile, cajuela 1974.
56. “Conversacio´n del embajador,” 412–13.
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with these two countries, which eventually resulted in economic and diplomatic
relationships. Additionally, some Chilean entrepreneurs were willing to open a
channel enabling Havana’s representatives to purchase products from the
outside world.57 According to Francisco Ferna´ndez, a Chilean diplomat based
in Havana from 1971, the Cuban revolutionary Emilio Aragone´s reached
Argentina after visiting Chile in order to assess Buenos Aires’s willingness to
formalize relations with Cuba.58 These secret talks bore fruit in 1973, when the
Cuban embassy in Buenos Aires was opened, with Aragone´s at its head. With
these favorable developments, Castro and the Cuban leadership were willing to
abandon revolutionary interventionism for a more conventional diplomacy.
During a three-week sojourn to Chile in November–December 1971, Castro
met with three Latin American presidents (Allende, Velasco Alvarado of Peru,
and Velasco Ibarra of Ecuador)—three more than he had been able to meet in
the previous ten years. In this new international scenario, Havana managed
to establish relations with Peru, Barbados, Guyana, Jamaica, and Trinidad
and Tobago in 1972, Argentina in 1973, Panama and Venezuela in 1974, and
Colombia in 1975.59 Allende’s bold decision to restore official links with Cuba
in 1970 decisively spurred Havana to launch a fruitful diplomatic offensive.
This seems to have been an urgent tactical decision, given how Cuba’s
international prestige and economic autonomy had started to wane. The widely
contested “Padilla affair,” which was perceived by many international leftists as
an indication that Havana had adopted Soviet cultural policy, tainted the
country’s image as the island of freedom and led a number of intellectuals to
withdraw support for the Cuban Revolution.60 Padilla’s fate announced the
beginning of what Ambrosio Fornet later called the “quinquenio gris” (and
what others preferred to label a decenio negro), justifiably engendering the
impression that Cuba was becoming more repressive. Mario Vargas Llosa, Juan
Goytisolo, and others famously rallied several writers previously linked to
Havana, such as Julio Corta´zar, Italo Calvino, Marguerite Duras, Jean-Paul
57. Harmer, Allende’s Chile, 134.
58. Ferna´ndez, interview by author.
59. Domı´nguez, To Make a World Safe, 225–26.
60. Heberto Padilla was first condemned by the Cuban state in 1968 for his
purportedly counterrevolutionary collection of poems Fuera del juego; the National Union
of Writers and Artists of Cuba deemed him the sort ofartist that “our enemies . . . need to
feed their Trojan horse at a time when imperialism puts into practice a policy offrontal armed
aggression against Cuba.” Padilla, Fuera del juego, 13. As censorship intensified, Padilla
experienced constant harassment by the authorities. He was eventually jailed in 1971 and
forced to give a statement of self-criticism, triggering an international controversy.
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Sartre, and Susan Sontag, behind an open letter published in Le Monde
expressing concern over the emergence of “sectarian tendencies” within Cas-
tro’s government.61 Shortly before this, the failure of the 1970 zafra, an attempt
to produce a record ten million tons of sugar, confirmed Cuba’s unescapable
economic dependency and hastened Havana’s quest for new international
markets. According to Aurelio Alonso, what failed with the zafra was “the idea
of entrenching an autonomous Socialist project.”62
Explicit support for the UP’s institutional political road was intended to
counter Cuba’s growing reputation as authoritarian by evincing respect for
democracy and extant institutions. Castro knew that, under these adverse cir-
cumstances, a posture more respectful of existing hemispheric institutions
was critical if he wanted to regain international respectability. “We are ready
to follow a politics of juridical principles and norms with countries that are
not lackeys, not unconditional instruments of the American aggression against
Cuba,” Castro stated in 1970.63
Castro publicly validated Allende’s project in an August 1, 1970, statement,
amid the Chilean presidential election campaign. This move proved fruitful
indeed. After Castro’s acceptance of the Chilean road to socialism, the PDC’s
vice president, Ricardo Valenzuela, declared that he was pleased by Cuba’s
awareness that socialism could be established “through popular votes.”64
Members of the centrist PR, like its president, Carlos Morales, found in Cas-
tro’s words a reason to be reassured: “Castro’s declarations were very posi-
tive because they clarified the differences between the Cuban and the Chilean
systems.”65
But the benefits of this new moment of Cuban-Chilean relations were not
one-sided. While Allende’s administration proved helpful for Cuba’s conti-
nental policy, Castro’s endorsement of the Chilean road to socialism had pos-
itive effects in the tense Chilean presidential campaign. By declaring for the first
time since 1959 that in a Latin American country “socialism can be reached by
an electoral victory,” Castro contributed to quenching doubts within the
Chilean radical Left, particularly among members of the Revolutionary Left
61. Fornet, El 71, 124–25; La Tercera (Santiago), 11 Dec. 2016. I thank one of the
article’s external reviewers for stressing the connection between the Padilla affair and
Cuba’s international reconfiguration.
62. Fornet, El 71, 32.
63. “Entrevista de nuestro Primer Ministro Comandante Fidel Castro,” Havana,
1970, AMINREX, fondo Chile, cajuela 1974.
64. Las Noticias de U´ltima Hora (Santiago), 13 Aug. 1970, p. 16.
65. La Estrella (Valparaı´so), 4 Aug. 1970, p. 1.
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Movement (MIR) and some Socialist activists reluctant to believe in a revolu-
tion based on the bourgeois order.66 The strategic divergences between Cuba
and the Soviet Union in the 1960s were locally reproduced within the intense
debates among the Chilean Left. While the PCCh strongly supported the
Soviet strategy of peaceful coexistence and sponsored an institutional path to
revolution, a majority within the PSCh adopted a belligerent approach modeled
on the Cuban example.67 Thus Allende’s constitutional democratic project did
not seem to be shared by those within his own party: the PSCh’s twenty-second
congress in 1967, by declaring “revolutionary violence . . . inevitable and
legitimate,” dealt Allende a major political defeat and heralded both further
radicalization and growing reservations about elections.68 While visiting Cuba
in 1969, the Socialist Tito Palestro, mayor of a Santiago municipality, admitted
that he and his constituents “support armed struggle and, moreover, think that
elections should be permanently abandoned.” He both praised the MIR’s
radical strategic line and stressed his profound disagreements with the PCCh.69
As the historian Luis Corvala´n Ma´rquez characterized the PCCh and PSCh of
the 1960s, they embodied “two hardly assimilable projects forced to follow the
same road.”70 The MIR, a movement that had disclaimed the electoral route
and established links with Havana, was unwilling to join the “electoral game”; as
Miguel Enrı´quez, general secretary of the MIR, put it in 1969, “No election,
armed struggle the only path.”71 Given such contentious debate, in which
Castro’s stance would likely exert significant influence, Cuba’s approval of
Allende’s candidacy was crucial to providing more ideological coherence to
the UP.72
Castro’s support was not a fait accompli. In fact, Cubans were at first quite
skeptical about the UP’s chances to cement a socialist project via existing polit-
ical institutions. It is enough to read Re´gis Debray’s Revolution in the Revolution?
(1967), a handbook containing Havana’s official doctrine, in which the French
philosopher condemned “the naive idealism inspiring those devoted to the
electoral opium, for whom socialism will come on the day when one half plus
66. El Siglo (Santiago), 5 Aug. 1970, p. 5.
67. See, for example, the articles in Corvala´n, Nuestra vı´a revolucionaria.
68. Haslam, Nixon Administration, 25.
69. Manuel Rolda´n to Carlos Neira, Havana, 27 Nov. 1969, AMINREX, fondo Chile,
cajuela 1969.
70. Corvala´n Ma´rquez, Del anticapitalismo al neoliberalismo, 57.
71. Miguel Enrı´quez, quoted in Palieraki, “Histoire critique,” 689.
72. I thank one ofthe external reviewers ofthis article’s first version for suggesting this
compelling idea.
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one of the electorate vote for it.”73 Cuban revolutionary theory since 1960,
when Guevara wrote the widely disseminated manual Guerrilla Warfare, was
anchored in the inevitability of armed insurrection for consolidating the final
victory. While Cuban theorists insisted on the need for a violent transforma-
tion, the Chilean road to socialism was founded on alliances built before and
after democratic elections. In Allende’s view, the subsequent construction of a
Marxist society had to be sustained by a planned economy and a gradual pro-
cess of people’s empowerment without transgressing the state’s constitutional
frame, personal liberties, or political pluralism.74
Aware of the political implications of Castro’s support, Allende sent to
Havana a delegation at the end of July 1970, nearly one month before the
election. Made up of a Communist deputy (Luis Guastavino), a Socialist activ-
ist (Ricardo Nu´n˜ez), a member of the moderate PR (Camilo Salvo), a cluster
of journalists (Carlos Jorquera, Fernando Rivas, and Leonardo Ca´ceres), and
two cameramen sent to record Castro’s message (Miguel Littin and Emilio
Navarro), the delegation aimed to persuade the Cubans that Allende’s path was
viable given Chile’s historical and political conditions.75 I have had the oppor-
tunity to interview five Chilean delegates who took part in these discussions,
which, along with press articles and the Cubans’ typewritten version of the
meeting with Castro on August 1, allow me to reconstruct part of the delega-
tion’s program.76
After the 17th anniversary of the July 26, 1953, attack on the Moncada
Barracks, the politicians of the delegation (Guastavino, Nu´n˜ez, and Salvo) were
hosted by two members of the Cuban Communist Party: Jesu´s Montane´,
the minister of communications, and Manuel Pin˜eiro, who was in charge
of the Latin American division within the General Intelligence Directorate.
73. Debray, Re´volution, 173. For insight into the close relationship between Debray and
Castro, see Karol, Les gue´rilleros au pouvoir, 37.
74. Riquelme Segovia, Rojo atardecer, 81.
75. A group of intellectuals from Chilean universities—including the historian
Herna´n Ramı´rez Necochea and the young professor Ricardo Lagos, who later would
become president of Chile—also visited Cuba in mid-July and met Castro, who referred
to Chile as a “particular case” benefiting from “serious” and “democratic” institutions.
Castro also stressed the honesty and “exceptionally progressive” character of the Chilean
bourgeoisie. Velasco Letelier, Visio´n de Cuba, 18. More information can be found in
Jadresic, Historia de Chile.
76. The members of the official delegation that I interviewed are Luis Guastavino,
Camilo Salvo, Miguel Littin, and Leonardo Ca´ceres. I also interviewed the priest Juan
Ochagavı´a, who landed in Havana in July 1970 and eventually joined the meeting at the
University of Havana.
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According to Salvo, both Cuban officials honestly believed in Allende’s revo-
lutionary pedigree but shared a pessimistic electoral prognosis: in the face of
imperialism, the UP had little chance of succeeding. But according to the
hosts, this adverse situation could be changed. Reflecting Havana’s tempered
approach, Montane´ and Pin˜eiro concluded that to counter the international
and domestic hostility, the leftist coalition should have built a wider alliance,
including the PDC.77
Later on, during a private meeting with the Castro brothers held in a room
of the Havana Libre Hotel, Guastavino attempted to convince the authorities
that in present-day Chile a socialist project could be realized within democratic
structures. Shortly before leaving for Cuba, Guastavino was informed that he
had been selected to convey Allende’s personal message to the Cuban leaders. It
should not be surprising that a Communist activist was given the responsibility
of defending the revolutionary character of the Chilean democratic way. As I
have noted, Allende’s political view proved closer to the Communists’ strategy
than to that of his own party, the PSCh. The PCCh had traditionally stressed
the need to establish political alliances and to gradually strengthen people’s
awareness within the democratic framework.78 Guastavino succeeded in
offering the Cubans an optimistic perspective on Chile. To reinforce his claims,
he quoted Vladimir Lenin’s “Left-Wing” Communism: An Infantile Disorder,
in which the Bolshevik provides an opening to nonviolent revolution.79 Castro
was cautious because “this was a sensitive matter related to highly internalized
questions,” but he eventually proved to be “very receptive” and willing to
collaborate.80
The proof came on August 1, during a larger meeting at the University of
Havana in which Castro expounded on his views regarding Latin American
development for eight hours.81 The Chilean delegation was joined by the
Chilean Jesuit priest Juan Ochagavı´a. Ochagavı´a today thinks that his presence
77. Camilo Salvo, interview by author, Santiago, 5 Sept. 2016. See also El Siglo
(Santiago), 2 Aug. 1970, p. 3.
78. A great deal of literature has been written on this topic. In particular, I strongly
recommend Pinto Vallejos, “Hacer la revolucio´n.”
79. This book was likely to appeal to the Chilean Communists, given Lenin’s denial
that only “illegal methods” are revolutionary, his appeal to unite forces through
parliamentary participation, and his insistence that each country has to determine its
“specific path” to revolution. Lenin, La maladie infantile, 93–94.
80. Luis Guastavino, interview by author, Vin˜a del Mar, 4 Feb. 2013; Luis Guastavino,
interview by author, Vin˜a del Mar, 30 Aug. 2016.
81. Fernando Rivas, “Fidel Castro contesta a El Mercurio,” Puro Chile (Santiago), 4
Aug. 1970, p. 24.
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in Havana was part ofa subtle strategy aimed at broadening Allende’s legitimacy
within Chilean society: “It was obviously a sort of manipulation.” “There was a
lot of lobbying for the Allende candidacy,” Ochagavı´a recalls, one part of which
consisted of “creating an image that Cuba was an open country.”82 By attending
the meeting in the University of Havana, the Jesuit helped convey a more widely
acceptable image of the Cuban Revolution. Not surprisingly, the leftist press
repeatedly emphasized his presence.83
Everything appeared to be meticulously designed to generate a strong
impression. During the University of Havana gathering, while Miguel Littin
and Channel 13’s Emilio Navarro were filming for the Chilean media—Littin
with a camera owned by the Cuban Institute of Cinematographic Art and
Industry—Castro made his startling declaration: “In 1970 Chile, socialism can
be reached by an electoral victory.”84 This was exactly what Allende was
seeking, and his friend Castro was perfectly aware of the statement’s signifi-
cance. During the meeting, the Cuban leader ironically stated, “You know what
is convenient for you. I can more or less imagine that you agree on the benefits
of this meeting.” Later during the event, he added, “it was our duty to make
these assertions.”85
It is worth noting that Castro’s message also had a series of subtle com-
ments on hemispheric politics. The Cubans avoided mechanistically transpos-
ing Chile’s conditions to other Latin American countries. While recognizing
that “armed struggle is not a dogma,” Castro nonetheless insisted that “Chile’s
situation cannot be compared with any other Latin American country.” What
made Chile so exceptional was its “institutional background” and “electoral
tradition.” The lı´der ma´ximo subsequently pointed out a critical factor in favor
of Allende carrying out his revolution: the global balance of power. On the one
hand, the forces of “imperialism,” overwhelmed by their involvement in the
Vietnam War, were no longer able to “directly intervene as [they] did in Cuba.”
82. Juan Ochagavı´a, interview by author, Santiago, 16 Sept. 2016.
83. See, for example, El Siglo (Santiago), 9 Aug. 1970, p. 2; Las Noticias de U´ltima Hora
(Santiago), 4 Aug. 1970, p. 2. Ochagavı´a published his own impressions about Cuba in a
rather positive article. Mensaje (Santiago), no. 192, 1970, pp. 417–28.
84. El Siglo (Santiago), 5 Aug. 1970, p. 5. The details about the filming come from
Miguel Littin, interview by author, Santiago–Rancagua, 4 Nov. 2016.
85. This meeting was also deemed relevant for Cuba’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
Due to the “importance of the declarations” and the fact that they constituted the first
interview granted after Castro’s Moncada Barracks anniversary speech, the ministry
requested a typewritten version of the conversation, containing 103 pages. “Entrevista de
nuestro Primer Ministro Comandante Fidel Castro,” Havana, 1970, AMINREX, fondo
Chile, cajuela 1974.
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On the other hand, recent transformations, particularly in Velasco Alvarado’s
Peru, served as an additional barrier against foreign aggression: “Chilean people
know now that Peru could not be used by imperialism.”86
Castro’s support did not go unnoticed in the Chilean political scene. As
Ricardo Nu´n˜ez stated, it had an enormous impact on the attitude of the “radical
Left.”87 Castro’s statement introduced a new and unexpected factor that forced
long-standing followers of the Cuban Revolution to reconsider their previous
concerns about the UP. The journalist Leonardo Ca´ceres offers a good example
ofthis. Deeply reluctant to back Allende, whom he considered “an old politician
from another time,” Ca´ceres acknowledged his concerns to Castro. “You are
profoundly wrong,” Castro replied, before claiming that Allende was a real
revolutionary. “That was so powerful for me, so convincing,” Ca´ceres recalled,
that “I came back and voted for Allende.”88 As expected, the Communist press
reproduced confident declarations made by various political personalities,
while the MIR adopted a more tolerant attitude toward the approaching elec-
tions.89 In August 1970, the MIR’s general secretary, Miguel Enrı´quez, allowed
his fellow party members to vote for the UP.90 In an subtle acceptance of
Allende’s strategy, Punto Final, a magazine led by a MIR militant, released an
issue eloquently entitled “Los votos + el fusil” (Votes + rifles).91 In Guastavino’s
words, as a consequence of the Cuban embrace of Allende’s project “se cerraba
el bloque UP tras Salvador Allende.”92
The public impact of Castro’s comments was strengthened through media
dissemination. Newspapers linked to left-wing organizations, such as El Siglo,
Las Noticias de U´ltima Hora, and Cları´n, published enthusiastic articles summa-
rizing Castro and highlighting the growing convergence of the leftist forces.
Some of the Chilean delegation who had met with the Cuban leaders, such as
86. Las Noticias de U´ltima Hora (Santiago), 7 Aug. 1970, p. 15.
87. Ferna´ndez Abara, Go´ngora Escobedo, and Arancibia Clavel, Ricardo Nu´n˜ez, 107.
88. Leonardo Ca´ceres, interview by author, Santiago, 2 Dec. 2016.
89. On August 5, 1970, the Communist newspaper El Siglo published an article
entitled “Remezo´n polı´tico por sus declaraciones para Chile” and added a reassuring
commentary by a Socialist activist. El Siglo (Santiago), 5 Aug. 1970, p. 1. The historian
Eugenia Palieraki attributes the MIR’s changed attitude toward Allende’s candidacy to,
among other factors, Cuba’s position. Palieraki, “Histoire critique,” 758.
90. Haslam, Nixon Administration, 53.
91. Punto Final (Santiago), 1 Sept. 1970.
92. Guastavino, interview. It is hard to translate this expression. A literary translation
would be “the UP circle was closed around Salvador Allende,” meaning that the UP joined
sides with Allende.
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Guastavino, gave public press conferences and media interviews.93 Television
seems to have played a major role too. The images recorded by Littin and the
journalists of Channel 13, the Pontifical Catholic University of Chile’s televi-
sion channel, were widely disseminated. Channel 9 broadcast at least twice a
selection of the University of Havana interview with Castro, in which the audi-
ence could see the Cuban leader replying to the questions posed by the famous
journalist Carlos Jorquera. Having received “countless letters and phone calls”
asking for a rebroadcast, Channel 13 did so.94
Taking into account the powerful influence that Castro’s support likely
exerted on both the radical and moderate Left—such as PR members willing
to accept Allende’s project but critical of revolutionary violence—it would not
be unreasonable to suggest that Cuba’s position contributed to Allende’s narrow
victory with 36.61 percent of the vote (against right-wing candidate Jorge
Alessandri’s 35.27 percent) in September 1970.
Epilogue
The Cuban political line on Chile could fluctuate, in response to continuing
assessment of the situation. Castro’s three-week visit to Chile in 1971 was
supposed to reassert Havana’s confidence in the Chilean revolution. Castro
insisted on the need of “taking advantage of each possibility” and rejected
“dogmatic” positions. These public interventions were continually supple-
mented with laudatory words concerning the Soviet Union’s “indisputable
internationalist spirit.”95 This indicates that Castro’s 1971 stay in Chile was
aimed at confirming both the Cuban-Soviet normalization and his eagerness for
a new path toward social transformation. Nonetheless, a couple of setbacks
overturned Castro’s optimism. Uruguay’s leftist Broad Front coalition suffered
a clear defeat in a presidential election held during Castro’s 1971 Chilean visit,
pushing the Cuban leader to state that only the “armed path” would now lead to
victory in that country.96 Chilean opposition used the media to harshly attack
the visiting leader, which led the latter to criticize “these bourgeois capitalistic
liberties.” A massive March of the Empty Pots took place two days before
Castro’s departure, unveiling the “fury of the reactionaries” and ultimately
triggering a belligerent conclusion from the Cuban leader: “When I see to what
degree the reactionaries are trying to morally disarm the people . . . in the
93. La Estrella (Valparaı´so), 10 Aug. 1970, p. 28; El Siglo (Santiago), 18 Aug. 1970, p. 18.
94. Las Noticias de U´ltima Hora (Santiago), 11 Aug. 1970, pp. 5, 13 (quote).
95. Castro, Cuba-Chile, 507–8.
96. Fermandois Huerta, Chile y el mundo, 240.
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bottom of my heart there is a conclusion: I will return to Cuba more revolu-
tionary than when I came . . . I will return to Cuba more extremist than when I
came.”97
The Cubans were able to see firsthand the obstacles that a “democratic
revolution” must face and harbored renewed concerns regarding the effec-
tiveness of participating in democratic elections. But it did not alter either
Cuba’s diplomatic offensive or its accelerated rapprochement with the Soviet
Union. Allende’s fall became the final proof, after a string of setbacks, that, for
now, Latin America was not yet ripe for revolution. Havana increasingly turned
to Africa, where thousands of soldiers fought in wars of national liberation.
Cuba found in the African continent fertile ground for the potential emergence
of a radical political project.98
Cuba’s validation (and later rebuff) of the uncompleted Chilean road to
socialism was a novelty, exemplifying the reshaping of Havana’s international
priorities. This change of tone should be seen not as mere pragmatic adaptation
but within the frame of a wider evolution of the local context under pres-
sure from the “inter-state system” and global developments.99 The reciprocal
influences between Chile and Cuba during Allende’s rise and fall exemplify how
a sociopolitical system such as the Cuban Revolution evolves through contacts
and interactions, thereby emphasizing the importance of the larger context in
understanding local transformations.100 This article shows how the revision
of ideological schemes that seemed inflexible during part of the 1960s made
Cuban revolutionary doctrine much more malleable than we would expect in
light of prior radicalism. At the end of the turbulent Latin American 1960s,
when leftist experiments started to reshape a political landscape previously
hostile to leftism, Cuba decisively reemerged on the hemispheric scene. The
encounter between the Cuban Revolution and the Chilean road to socialism in
1970 was not just a response to the contemporary conjuncture but also the fruit
of a long-term evolution rooted in previous developments and molded by a
complex set of factors.101
The local and the global are always intertwined. This is particularly true
when analyzing the uneven evolution of the global Left during the Cold War.
97. Castro, Cuba-Chile, 474, 483.
98. See the groundbreaking Gleijeses, Conflicting Missions. See also Harmer, “Two,
Three, Many Revolutions?,” 85.
99. Vanhaute, World History, 10–14, 155–57.
100. Crossley, What Is Global History?, 9, defines systems as “the narrative of
interacting structures changing each other at the same time.”
101. I thank one of the reviewers for this suggestion.
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Cuba’s transnational influence in Latin America has been insistently high-
lighted by a number of scholars, but less has been said about Havana’s con-
tinuous adjustment to external fluctuations. Castro’s opening to Allende’s rev-
olution, at first glance incompatible with Cuban revolutionary theory, was
anchored in the need for constant political reassessment, an inevitable part of
the “global Cold War.”102 By avoiding the traditional depiction ofthe Cold War
as a binary fight between communism and capitalism, I aim to provide a more
complex picture in which South-South influences played a major role in shaping
the second halfof the twentieth century.103 The new Cold War history offers a
compelling multidimensional perspective that, for Latin America, has resulted
in a reexamination of Cuba’s position in world politics.104 Havana can no longer
be regarded as a mere appendix of Moscow; instead, it was a crucial actor and
powerful model for Latin American revolutionaries. The constant struggle
between the United States and the Soviet Union was at times overshadowed by
cross-continental influences, elevating Cuba as a key (perhaps the most sig-
nificant) point of reference for understanding the Latin American Cold War
and the global Left.
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